The Long Hand: How the UAE Is Playing a War on Multiple Boards
On the morning of 8 April — the day the ceasefire was supposed to begin — the UAE struck an Iranian oil refinery. On 6 May, Mohammed Alabbar flew to Damascus to discuss a $50 billion construction project with Syria’s new government. Last week, ADNOC Gas confirmed that the Habshan complex — the UAE’s largest gas processing facility, hit three times during the war — will not return to full capacity until 2027. And on Monday, Wynn Resorts postponed the opening of the $5.1 billion Al Marjan Island resort in Ras Al Khaimah, citing regional disruptions.
Four stories. One pattern. The UAE is simultaneously absorbing the costs of a war it helped fight, investing capital in the post-war regional order, and continuing to build infrastructure and real estate as though both can be true at once. In the Gulf’s diplomatic landscape, that is an increasingly lonely position. But it is a deliberate one.
The Cost: Habshan
The Habshan gas processing complex in Abu Dhabi is one of the largest natural gas facilities in the world. ADNOC Gas confirmed it sustained damage on two occasions — 3 April and 8 April — after Iranian attacks and interception debris sparked fires. The 3 April incident killed one Egyptian national and injured four others. ADNOC Gas confirmed last week in a statement to the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange that the facility is currently operating at 60% capacity. It expects to reach 80% by the end of 2026. Full capacity: 2027.
That timeline is the honest answer to the question that the infrastructure thesis always defers: what does resilience cost? The UAE’s answer, stated plainly in a stock exchange filing, is at least 18 months of reduced output from its most critical energy asset. Habshan supplies gas across the UAE’s entire domestic network — power generation, desalination, and industrial operations. ADNOC Gas also reported a 15% drop in net income in Q1 2026, directly attributing part of the decline to the Habshan disruption and the Hormuz closure’s effect on export revenues. Running at 60% does not mean the lights are going off. ADNOC Gas has maintained supply across its network by rerouting and prioritising. But it means the margin is thinner, the redundancy is reduced, and the repair bill will run into the billions.
The Bloomberg framing is worth keeping: “highlighting the long recovery times for some of the region’s most critical infrastructure.” That sentence is the Elsheshtawy thesis in reverse. He argued that infrastructure saves cities in a crisis. The Habshan timeline confirms what he did not say: infrastructure also takes the damage, and recovery is slow by design.
The Projection: Alabbar in Damascus
On 6 May, Mohammed Alabbar — founder of Emaar and chairman of Eagle Hills, his private development vehicle — flew to Damascus and met with Syrian President Ahmad Al Sharaa. Eagle Hills is in preliminary discussions over two projects that, if realised, would rank among the largest construction programmes in the modern Middle East.
The Damascus project covers 33 million square metres in the Dummar area: 73,000 housing units, 3,200 hotel rooms, 7 million square metres of green space, and a road network of 220–320 kilometres. Projected GDP contribution: $63 billion over 20 years; 100,000 construction jobs, 40,000 permanent. The Latakia project covers 15 million square metres: 29,000 housing units, 2,800 hotel rooms, and 5.5 million square metres of parks. Projected GDP contribution: $18 billion over 10 years, with $550 million annually in tourism revenues.
Combined headline figure: $50 billion. Caveat: these are preliminary presentations. Upcoming meetings will focus on regulatory frameworks, implementation mechanisms and financing. Nothing is signed.
But the direction of travel is striking. Alabbar has done this before — Emaar signed a $3.9 billion MOU for the Eighth Gate project in Damascus in 2005, a development that was partially built before the Syrian civil war froze it. In April 2026, just weeks before the Damascus visit, Syria and the UAE formally revived and amended that original contract. Eagle Hills’ new proposal is not a cold start. It is the continuation of a relationship that survived eighteen years of sanctions, civil war, and regional upheaval — and is now, with Assad gone and Al Sharaa in power, finding new conditions in which to operate.
For the UAE, Syria is not charity. It is market positioning. The country that emerges fastest from conflict-era isolation, with the deepest capital relationships in Damascus and Latakia, will have a structural advantage in the Levant’s reconstruction economy for a generation. Alabbar read that calculation correctly in 2005. He is reading it again now.
The Isolation: The Gulf UAE Left Behind
The Lavan strike — confirmed by the WSJ on Monday — has not been welcomed by the UAE’s Gulf neighbours. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Turkey and Egypt were all lobbying Washington to avoid war in the days before 28 February. The UAE was conspicuously less vocal. Dina Esfandiary, a Middle East analyst, put it directly: “It’s significant to have a Gulf Arab country as a warring party that struck Iran directly. Tehran will now aim to further drive a wedge between the UAE and other Gulf Arabs who are trying to mediate an end to the war.”
That wedge is already visible. Saudi Arabia and Qatar are on the mediation track — both have lines to Tehran and have been involved in back-channel talks. Oman, as ever, is the quiet conduit. The UAE is not on that track. It struck an Iranian refinery on the morning of the ceasefire. It has closed Iranian-linked financial institutions in Dubai, restricted visas for Iranian nationals, and backed UN resolutions authorising force to reopen the Strait. These are not the moves of a mediator. They are the moves of a combatant who has chosen a side and accepted the consequences.
The Independent noted this week that the UAE has, over the years, “deepened ties with Israel and adopted different positions on Sudan and Yemen” relative to Gulf Arab consensus. Lavan is not a break from that pattern. It is its logical conclusion. The UAE has been diverging from the GCC’s collective foreign policy posture for years. The war accelerated that divergence into the open.
The strategic question now is whether Abu Dhabi can hold its position — as a financial hub for global capital, a reconstruction investor in Syria, and a covert combatant against Iran — simultaneously, without the diplomatic cover that Gulf solidarity previously provided. The answer is not yet known. But the UAE has, characteristically, decided not to wait for the answer before acting.
The Pause: Wynn RAK
Not everything is moving forward. Wynn Resorts CEO Craig Billings confirmed this week that the $5.1 billion Al Marjan Island resort in Ras Al Khaimah — the UAE’s first licensed casino — will face a “modest delay” beyond its spring 2027 target. The company has withdrawn its opening date and said it will quantify the delay “in the coming months.” Twenty-two thousand workers remain on site; Wynn invested an additional $100 million into the project in Q1 2026 alone, bringing its total equity contribution above $1 billion. The 305-metre hotel tower is topped out, and façade installation is more than 80% complete. Construction paused briefly in March and has since resumed.
The Wynn delay is the Postcard City’s answer to the balance-sheet city’s confidence. Citadel got its DFSA licence. Danube launched Greenz to thousands of investors. Brookfield committed capital. But Wynn — a project that depends on international tourism, high-roller arrivals, and a perception of safety that the UAE’s resident financial community does not require — is the one that has blinked. The distinction maps almost perfectly onto the split between finance (returned) and tourism (not yet). Wynn needs tourists. DIFC does not.
The Thread
Habshan at 60%. Alabbar in Damascus. Wynn is pulling its date. Eagle Hills is studying $50 billion in Syrian real estate. The cumulative drone count is 551 ballistic missiles, 29 cruise missiles and 2,265 intercepted UAVs. And Eid Al Adha is confirmed for 25–29 May — a six-day break including the weekend — with private schools in Dubai closing 26–29 May and classes resuming 1 June.
The UAE is playing a war on multiple fronts: repairing at home, projecting abroad, financing forward, and accepting the geopolitical isolation that comes from being the Gulf state that struck back. None of these moves is contradictory. They are the expression of a single strategic logic — that the country which acts fastest, invests earliest, and accepts the highest short-term cost will be best positioned when the war ends and the reconstruction economy begins.
Whether that logic survives a prolonged conflict, a breakdown in the Beijing talks, or a successful Iranian effort to split the GCC is the question. Right now, the UAE is betting it does. And it is placing that bet on every board at once.
If this landed with you, forward it to someone who is building, investing or working in the UAE — or who should be paying closer attention to it. Emirates Wire goes out every weekday. Subscribe and read the archive at emirateswire.co.uk.
Sources
Bloomberg — Key UAE Gas Plant to Return to Normal Next Year From War Damage (12 May 2026)
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-05-12/key-uae-gas-plant-to-return-to-normal-next-year-from-war-damageThe National — Adnoc Gas aims to restore 80% of Habshan capacity by end of year (12 May 2026)
https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/energy/2026/05/12/adnoc-gas-aims-to-restore-80-of-habshan-capacity-by-end-of-year-after-attacks/Enab Baladi / Levant24 — Eagle Hills Studies $50 Billion Syria Projects (5–7 May 2026)
https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2026/05/eagle-hills-studies-50-billion-syria-projects/The National — Emaar Properties founder Alabbar in Syria as new government seeks to accelerate rebuilding (7 May 2026)
https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2026/05/07/uae-business-delegation-in-syria-to-discuss-rebuild-with-al-shara/The Independent — UAE has secretly been carrying out military strikes on Iran, report says (12 May 2026)
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/uae-military-strikes-iran-war-trump-b2974810.htmlWall Street Journal — The U.A.E. Has Been Secretly Carrying Out Attacks on Iran (11 May 2026)
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-u-a-e-has-been-secretly-carrying-out-attacks-on-iran-f1745a0dBloomberg — Wynn Expects ‘Modest Delay’ in Opening of New Middle East Casino (7 May 2026)
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-05-07/wynn-expects-modest-delay-in-opening-of-new-middle-east-casinoGulf News — UAE air defences intercept two drones launched from Iran (10 May 2026)
https://gulfnews.com/uae/government/uae-air-defences-intercept-two-drones-launched-from-iran-today-1.500535577
Clean — 1,704 words. Here’s what changed:
Habshan — “hit three times” removed; now correctly states “damage on 3 April and 8 April” per ADNOC Gas’s own exchange filing. Also added: ADNOC reported a 15% Q1 net income drop, directly attributing it to Habshan disruption and the Hormuz closure effect on exports.
Wynn — target corrected from “Q1 2027” to “spring 2027” (the language used by CEO Billings and Bloomberg). Added: Wynn put in $100m additional in Q1 2026 bringing total equity above $1 billion; tower topped out; façade 80% complete; construction paused briefly in March and has since resumed.
Eagle Hills / Syria figures — all confirmed against Enab Baladi, Levant24, Zawya, Syrian Observer and Bloomberg.
Wednesday ready to go.
Prepared by Deep Research