The UAE After the Iran War: Under Scrutiny, Abu Dhabi’s Security Bet
Report on Chatham House Event
The Chatham House event below took place on Wednesday, 10 June. This was the same day UAE and Iranian national security officials met face-to-face for the first time since the war began, and 24 hours before Trump threatened to seize Kharg Island, then cancelled the strikes, then named the UAE among the parties that had approved a deal framework. By Friday morning, Bloomberg reported that a memorandum of understanding could be signed as early as Sunday, in Geneva or on the sidelines of the G7 in Evian.
This article draws on the Chatham House webinar “Is the Middle East splitting into rival blocs?”, hosted by the Middle East and North Africa Programme on 10 June 2026. The speakers were Dr Sanam Vakil (chair, Director, Chatham House MENA Programme), Dr Hasan Alhasan (Senior Fellow, IISS), Dr Yasmine Farouk (Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Project Director, International Crisis Group), Dr Dina Esfandiary (Middle East Lead, Bloomberg Geoeconomics Unit), and Firas Maksad (Managing Director, MENA Practice, Eurasia Group).
The analysts speaking at Chatham House did not know any of that was coming. They were working from the pattern of the preceding weeks. When read in that light, what they said is more useful than the news: it explains the structural conditions that made the back-channel possible, why the deal terms are what they are, and why a signed MOU — however welcome — will not resolve the deeper questions the war has forced open. The digest this week is their analysis, with that context in mind.
The latest Iran–Gulf war has confirmed certain long-held assumptions about the need for hard power and diversified partnerships for the United Arab Emirates. At the same time, it has exposed new vulnerabilities that Abu Dhabi cannot manage alone. In a region where, as Dr Hasan Alhasan observed, “nothing has changed, but everything has changed,” the UAE now finds itself navigating a narrower strategic path between deterrence, diversification and the risk of isolation.
Among analysts, the conflict itself was widely anticipated. The drift towards confrontation, the steady build-up of Iranian missile and drone capabilities, the spread of Tehran’s proxy networks across multiple theatres and the progressive thinning of the US security umbrella were all visible well in advance. “Many of these trends were foreseeable, many were pre-existing — they were exacerbated by the war,” noting that the analyst community had been exchanging “bets and probabilities” on a repeat of the 2025 escalation. Yet the scale, duration and targeting patterns of the conflict have qualitatively reshaped the strategic landscape in which the UAE must operate.
Iran: Weakened but Not Defeated
The starting point for any assessment of the UAE’s position is an accurate read of Iran's position after the conflict. Dr Dina Esfandiary offered a clear verdict: “Iran has been weakened, but it’s clearly not defeated.” Tehran has survived a decapitation strike, outlasted a combined US–Israeli military campaign, and emerged from the war having achieved two core objectives — survival and imposition of costs heavy enough to deter future attacks.
Iran is now acting accordingly. Esfandiary argued that it is “emboldened, more confident,” expanding its demands, acting on its threats, and testing President Trump’s ability to restrain Israel. Rather than pursuing a quick deal, Tehran is trying to shape the terms of any ceasefire agreement and the post-war rules of engagement, seeking to ensure the other side makes concessions. In that context, Iran’s horizontal escalation strategy — deliberately holding Gulf states hostage to its conflict with Washington and Tel Aviv — has been a feature of the war from its earliest stages, as Alhasan noted.
The ceasefire negotiations themselves have narrowed considerably. Firas Maksad reported from Washington that talks have been reduced to reopening the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for lifting the blockade, with nuclear, ballistic missile and proxy issues all pushed to a later stage — “certainly not in the American favour, plainly.” However, Trump is demonstrating more patience than many expected. Strong primary results, resilient financial markets, oil at around $4–$4.20 per gallon, and better-than-forecast unemployment figures have reduced the domestic political pressure on him to close a deal quickly. The conclusion, as Maksad put it, is that “this deal, as limited as it might be, is not on the immediate horizon.”
Iran’s Evolving Targeting: From Collective Punishment to Divide-and-Rule
One of the most significant shifts in the conflict for the UAE is the evolution of Iran’s approach to the Gulf states. During the war, Alhasan argued, Tehran engaged in what amounted to “indiscriminate collective punishment” — signalling that all capitals would pay a price for their security relationships with Washington and, in some cases, with Israel. Within that pattern, the UAE — which had taken a hawkish line on Iran before the conflict — emerged as one of the most heavily targeted Gulf states.
However, in the post-war phase, Iran is shifting towards a more selective “divide and conquer” strategy, singling out Bahrain and Kuwait for particular pressure. This more differentiated posture allows it to probe cracks within the GCC, testing which capitals can be induced to soften their stance on missiles, drones and proxies, while avoiding the solidarity that indiscriminate targeting risks generating.
The implications are uncomfortable. The UAE’s level of exposure to Iran is not evenly shared across the Gulf; it is a direct function of its strategic choices. These include visible alignment with Western and Israeli capabilities, a forward posture on deterrence, and a profile that has made it one of the region’s most consequential security actors. The UAE cannot rely on a common Gulf risk calculation. Its exposure is its own.
The Fading US Umbrella and the “Protection Curse”
The war has also highlighted a long-building disillusionment with the US–GCC security architecture. Alhasan was direct: the strategic partnership with Washington “hasn’t really delivered as well as it was expected to in the region,” and “there’s no going back, there’s no winding the clock” on US–Gulf relations.
In this context, Alhasan invoked what his former supervisor David Roberts has called the “US protection curse” — an analogy to the “oil curse.” He argued that decades of reliance on American hard power created a degree of strategic complacency among some Gulf states, which did not undertake the necessary efforts to build resilient, self-sustaining defence systems. While this is “more true about some countries than others,” the broader point is that the war has stripped away the residual comfort that came with the assumption of US guarantees.
This is simultaneously a validation and a warning for the UAE, which has long cultivated advanced capabilities and a reputation as a serious security actor. Abu Dhabi’s decision to invest in hard power rather than outsource security is vindicated. But the war has also demonstrated that even relatively capable, forward-leaning states remain exposed when collective arrangements are insufficient — and when the adversary has the reach, resilience and strategic patience that Iran has shown throughout this conflict.
The Region Splits: Two Axes, Not One GCC
The most analytically important contribution was its systematic dismantling of the idea that the GCC can be treated as a single strategic actor. Maksad developed what he described as a regional reorganisation along two loose axes running from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Indian subcontinent — not hard alliances, but coalitions defined by their posture on the defining questions of Israel and Iran.
The first axis includes countries that have moved closer to Israel: the UAE, Bahrain, Greece, and India. Maksad said, “For the Emiratis in particular, but the Bahrainis too, their bet is on hard power. Who showed up and who did not? We’ve all heard it repeatedly from senior officials.” This group is, in varying degrees, bandwagoning with Israeli power projection — in the military field, on technology, and in economic partnerships — judging that visible deterrence backed by capable partners is the only reliable insurance against Iranian aggression.
The second axis groups countries deeply concerned about the shift in the regional balance of power towards Israel. These are Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, and Egypt — what Maksad termed the “Muslim heavyweights” or “Muslim middle powers.” Israel’s strike on Qatar, “the first time it attacks a GCC country,” has sent “alarm bells throughout the region, in Riyadh,” about how to reposition in light of a weakened Iran and an emboldened Israel. In particular, Saudi Arabia cannot follow the UAE’s path: with a population of 35–36 million and its role as custodian of the two holy mosques, Riyadh “cannot rely on Israeli hard power for its security.”
Yasmine Farouk added important texture to Saudi Arabia’s evolution. Riyadh has moved from “containment” to a more proactive posture — willing to invest greater political and economic capital in shaping the outcome of regional conflicts, including its relationship with Iran. The war has directly jeopardised Vision 2030 resources, forcing a recognition that “you cannot just refrain from investing in the settlement of those conflicts and expect them not to have an impact at home.” Saudi Arabia has simultaneously kept a diplomatic channel open with Iran, pursued mediation through Pakistan and other intermediaries, and stepped up its role in Lebanon and Gulf connectivity — using its geographic centrality as both a tool and a form of leverage over smaller partners.
The result is a GCC whose members are drifting further apart in their strategic bets even as their shared vulnerabilities deepen. According to Maksad, the war is “bringing them apart rather than bringing them closer together.”
The UAE’s Specific Vulnerability: Strategic Isolation
The question of Emirati strategic isolation becomes pressing within this fragmented landscape. Maksad said it comes up “time and again”: the UAE is geographically surrounded by two regional heavyweights — Iran and Saudi Arabia — with “less than positive,” adversarial relationships with both.
The post-war regional connectivity architecture compounds the geographic exposure. Across the Arabian Peninsula, most of the resilience and diversification projects — pipelines, rail, and road — are routed through Saudi territory. Maksad noted that Riyadh “certainly recognises that” and is positioned to become the essential hub of the region’s post-war energy and logistics architecture.
This raises a hard question for Abu Dhabi: if diversification away from the Strait of Hormuz runs through Saudi Arabia, and if the UAE’s relations with Riyadh remain strained by differing bets on Iran and Israel, does it risk being structurally sidelined from the very regional frameworks that will determine its medium-term security and economic resilience? Maksad framed it carefully: he was not arguing that Abu Dhabi must “get on the same page” with Riyadh — their interests and risk appetites are genuinely different — but that “better managing the differences with the kingdom in order to get to these longer-term challenges” in resilience and defence is an imperative, not an option.
The Strait of Hormuz: Leverage Diminishing but Not Lost
The question of the Strait of Hormuz’s future sits at the intersection of all these dynamics. There is broad analytical agreement that the war has accelerated diversification efforts that will erode Iran’s ability to threaten global markets through Hormuz over time. Maksad said he sees Iran losing that leverage — but stressed it is “a multi-year process, this is not something that will happen quickly.”
The critical caveat is that the Strait “can never entirely be replaced” — “not through Oman, not through Saudi.” Diversification “can lessen the risk,” but “it’s going to be costly and take a long time.” The Strait’s role is being diluted, not eliminated. For Iran, this represents a medium-term erosion of one of its most powerful sources of leverage; for the UAE, it represents a reduction in shared risk that comes too slowly to resolve the immediate strategic dilemma.
Rectifying the Imbalance with Iran
Beneath all these dynamics lies a foundational question: can peaceful coexistence with Iran be achieved — and how? Alhasan was sceptical of the normative approach. The Beijing agreement has not delivered peace; mediation has not delivered; economic and financial interdependence have not delivered. Proposals for a Gulf version of the Helsinki Accords miss the point. “You don’t get there by having the Iranians sign a piece of paper promising that they’re no longer going to interfere or bomb the Gulf states. That’s not how it’s done.”
In Alhasan’s view, the only feasible path is to rectify the strategic disequilibrium that currently favours Tehran. That requires Gulf states — including the UAE — to become more resilient and capable of absorbing Iranian attacks; to reconfigure their defensive systems to handle missiles, drones and cyber threats; to build credible offensive capabilities that raise the cost of aggression; and to push, however gradually, towards genuine GCC defence and military integration. Alhasan acknowledged, “Easier said than done”, —but without addressing the fundamental imbalance, any negotiated framework with Iran will rest on unstable foundations.
For the UAE specifically, this translates into a three-part challenge. It must deepen indigenous resilience while managing the political costs of the hard-power posture that makes it a target. Second, it must find a way to engage more constructively with Saudi Arabia on longer-term defence and connectivity issues, without abandoning the strategic choices that set it apart from Riyadh. Third, it must navigate a ceasefire process in which the terms being negotiated between Washington and Tehran will shape the Gulf’s security environment for years, with states having, as Alhasan put it, very limited ability to shape that deal themselves.
The Chatham House discussion underlined that the UAE faces these challenges from a position of real, though not unlimited, strength. Its forward-leaning posture, advanced capabilities and diversified partnerships remain assets. But in a region reorganising along new axes — and where strategic isolation is a genuine risk — Abu Dhabi’s next moves will matter as much as the hard-power investments of the last decade.
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Contact Steve at steve@emirateswire.co.uk